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ABSTRACT 
Functioning markets for technology are an important determinant for the type, scope and dis-
tribution of innovation activities in an economy. However, markets for technology are often 
underdeveloped or inefficient. Existing theory attributes such imperfections to the supply side 
or differences in market designs. We know comparatively little, though, about the structural 
forces that shape the demand side of markets for technology. In this study, we reason that de-
mand depends on the sectoral pattern of innovation and the distance of a country’s industry to 
the global technological frontier. We explore these dimensions based on longitudinal indus-
try-level data from the Community Innovation Survey. We find that the demand on markets 
for technology is particularly driven by science-based industries and to a lesser degree by 
scale-intensive industries. Demand decreases, though, the closer industries are to the techno-
logical frontier. These findings highlight sector specific opportunities and constraints for poli-
cies promoting markets for technology. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Markets for technology are a crucial instrument for many firms searching for and acquiring 
external knowledge for their innovation processes (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 2001; 
Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Arora and Nandkumar, 2012; Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). On 
these markets, also referred to as markets for ideas (Gans and Stern, 2003, 2010; Agrawal, 
Cockburn, and Zhang, 2015), disembodied knowledge is traded at a certain price, for exam-
ple by trading the intellectual property (IP) itself or granting licenses. Prior research suggests 
that markets for technology can be important institutions for allowing vertical specialization 
and improving the allocative efficiency of innovation activities in a country. In other words, 
such markets determine which firms produce new technologies and which ones commercial-
ize them (Arora et al., 2001; Agrawal et al., 2015). However, several studies highlight that 
markets for technology are underdeveloped or inefficient (Gans, Hsu, and Stern, 2008; Gans 
and Stern, 2010; Kani and Motohashi, 2012), pointing mostly to imperfections in the market 
design or the unwillingness of suppliers to offer technologies (Agrawal et al., 2015). How-
ever, we have little comprehensive insights into the demand side of markets for technology as 
well as on the structural forces that shape the demand on such markets (Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010). 
This study seeks to address these shortcomings and identifies heterogeneities in the de-
mand on markets for technology. Extant literature on markets for technology seems to build 
on the implicit, yet important assumption that demand is ubiquitously available and homoge-
nously distributed across countries and industries. This strong assumption is surprising, given 
the distinct sectoral patterns of technical change (Pavitt, 1984) as well as evidence that indus-
tries differ widely in the degree to which firms in those industries find the acquisition of tech-
nologies on markets useful and beneficial (e.g., Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). 
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Our study is designed to provide an account of the realized demand on markets for tech-
nology in Europe by industry, i.e. the investments that firms have made on those markets in 
technology. A well-developed demand side is an important prerequisite of “market thick-
ness”, i.e. the presence of sufficient potential buyers and suppliers to allow the market to 
match them efficiently (Roth, 2007; Gans and Stern, 2010). A lack of market thickness has 
been shown to be one of the main reasons why markets for technology fail (Agrawal et al., 
2015). Subsequently, we seek to explain the demand side of the market by decomposing the 
demand at the industry level along two dimensions: the sectoral patterns of technical change, 
describing the nature of the innovation activities in a specific industry (Pavitt, 1984), as well 
as how technologically intensive and advanced an industry in a country is vis-à-vis the tech-
nological frontier (Kumar and Russell, 2002; Mahmood and Rufin, 2005).  
Given the shortage of empirical priors, we conduct an exploratory study that utilizes the 
unique data opportunity provided by the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) to study the 
demand on markets for technology for 20 different industries in 15 European countries over a 
seven-year period. We find the size of markets for technology to vary greatly between indus-
tries and countries in Europe, indicating that such markets are in fact very heterogeneous. 
Moreover, we show that the demand is significantly associated with the pattern of innovation 
firms in an industry follow and with the distance of an industry to the global technological 
frontier. In that sense, demand on markets is driven by science-based industries and to a 
lesser degree by scale-intensive industries in a country. Moreover, industries that are compar-
atively more distant from the technological frontier create demand on markets for technology. 
Taken together, we find that buying knowledge on markets for technology is an integral part 
of sectoral innovation patterns of some industries (science-based, scale-intensive) but not oth-
ers and that the demand on markets for technologies is constrained by technological sophisti-
cation of the industries reducing its usefulness relative to internal R&D. 
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Our study contributes to extant research on markets for technology in at least three ways. 
First, we respond to calls in the literature and identify structural features of industries that 
propel or constrain demand on markets for technology (Arora and Gambardella, 2010). We 
reason that demand on markets for technology depends on sectoral innovation patterns and 
technological leadership positions of countries in specific industries. Delineating these factors 
enables future studies to (a) approximate the demand side of markets for technology at the in-
dustry level in a country and (b) separate demand side mechanisms from the supply side. We 
demonstrate the usefulness of this approach by providing a systematic account of the demand 
side of markets for technology in Europe for the period from 2008 to 2014, differentiated by 
industry. While prior research contains numerous estimations of the (worldwide) size of the 
market for technology, evidence remains patchy. Arora and Gambardella (2010), for exam-
ple, argue that the world market size has increased substantially between 1995 and 2002 in 
terms of transaction value, reaching about USD 100 billion. Robbins (2006) estimates the to-
tal income from licensing in the United States in 2002 to be about USD 50 billion. These esti-
mates, however, typically do not disaggregate the market size per industry or they are only 
focused on single industries like pharmaceuticals. As a result, the mapping we provide in this 
study allows tailoring innovation policies intended to expanding the overall size and utiliza-
tion of markets for technology to specific industries. 
Second, our research advances literature that analyses the consequences of industry dif-
ferences in patterns of innovation activities and technological leadership by extending it to 
consequences for sectoral markets for technology. While this stream of literature takes into 
account that innovation in an industry can depend on knowledge production by other firms or 
sectors (e.g., Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008), we know little about whether this interaction 
between firms can be accomplished via markets, arguably the most efficient form of eco-
nomic interaction. In that regard, more developed markets for technology offer considerable 
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cost advantages and the flexibility associated with market transactions which may outweigh 
the advantages of other, more collaborative and relational forms of external knowledge acqui-
sition (e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006). Moreover, the notion that the demand on markets for 
technology depends on an industry’s leadership status highlights that industries benefit une-
venly from market development because markets may simply not offer access to the most 
cutting-edge research but rather to a considerable amount of “shelf-warmer technologies” 
(Grimpe, 2006) that may not advance innovation in leading industries (Grimpe and Sofka, 
2016). 
Third, our analysis provides an empirical platform that other studies can use to quantify 
the size of markets for technology in various industries and countries. Based on publicly 
available data from the CIS, we calculate aggregate firm expenditures on markets for technol-
ogy in 20 different industries, 15 European countries and over seven years. The data comple-
ment prior efforts in the literature that have focused on measures such as the supply of uni-
versity patents (e.g., Arora and Nandkumar, 2012), or narrowly focused on industries with 
high patent propensity (e.g., Gambardella, Giuri, and Luzzi, 2007). Hence, our research ad-
dresses not only the general shortage of data on these particular market transactions but can 
trigger future research on a variety of related topics, such as the interaction of markets for 
technology with firm strategies and particularly those directed at opening up the innovation 
process (Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
We provide a structured review of extant literature on the demand side of markets for tech-
nology in three steps. First, we review central theoretical mechanisms determining the size of 
markets for technology in general and afterwards for the demand side in particular. Subse-
quently, we introduce the theories that we will use to uncover sectoral patterns of demand on 
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markets for technologies, i.e. sectoral patterns of technological change, and technological 
leadership of industries. 
The size of markets for technology  
The size of markets for technologies depends on the presence of supply, demand as well as 
the efficiency of market mechanisms. Extant literature on market design (Roth, 2007; Gans 
and Stern, 2010) suggests three features that are associated with efficient market operations: 
market thickness (referring to sufficient opportunities for suppliers and buyers to trade), lack 
of congestion (referring to a transaction speed that is slow enough to allow participants to 
seek alternatives but fast enough to ensure market clearing), and market safety (referring to 
the absence of incentives for misrepresentation or strategic action). While congestion and 
safety are mostly design features at the market level, thickness relates most directly to supply 
and demand on markets for technology. 
Market thickness implies that knowledge exchange does not depend on the presence of a 
specific buyer and supplier, so that the value of the knowledge is determined indirectly by the 
market interaction. Buyers and suppliers reveal their preference prices for a particular tech-
nology, and the market mechanism determines the equilibrium price at which buyers and sup-
pliers cannot find a better offer. Efficient markets allow for allocative efficiency (Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010). However, many market transactions do not emerge in such clear-cut 
form. They can be embedded, e.g. in alliance agreements (Arora et al., 2001), or reduce the 
search costs borne by buyers and suppliers of knowledge by providing more limited services, 
such as brokerage, auctioning, or online presentation (Yanagisawa and Guellec, 2009; 
Dushnitsky and Klueter, 2011). At the same time, the types of knowledge that can be traded 
on markets for technology are limited, as the knowledge must typically be fully developed, 
codified, and ready to use. 
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Markets allow knowledge producers to sell the knowledge itself instead of developing 
complementary assets in, for example, distribution, manufacturing, or servicing for the pur-
pose of commercializing that knowledge on the product market (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff, 
2001; Gans and Stern, 2003). Conversely, firms that possess complementary assets do not 
need to invest in the development of new technologies because they can simply buy them on 
the market for technology (Arora and Nandkumar, 2012).  
Industries differ in how thick their markets for technology are. Important determinants of 
market thickness are the nature of the knowledge that is tradable and the institutional rules, 
especially rules on intellectual property rights (IPR), which govern potential market transac-
tions. First, knowledge traded on markets needs to be codified. Although, in principle, all 
knowledge can be codified, the costs of doing so can be excessive (Conti, Gambardella, and 
Novelli, 2013). If the costs are too high, the knowledge will not be codified and therefore not 
offered on the market for technology. Second, appropriability regimes are determined by the 
legal and technological conditions in an industry (Teece, 1986). As appropriability hazards 
increase, fewer knowledge producers will be willing to offer knowledge on a market for tech-
nology (Gans et al., 2008). Arundel and Kabla (1998) estimate that roughly one-third of all 
inventions are patented. They find that this patent propensity ranges from 15 percent in iron 
and steel production to 74 percent in pharmaceuticals. Hence, there is a remarkable share of 
knowledge that is either kept secret (e.g., Hall et al., 2014) or that does not qualify for patent-
ing based on the formal criteria of the patent office or inventors’ expectations of benefits. The 
low levels of patented knowledge combined with significant inter-industry differences conse-
quently affect the functioning of markets for technology.  
Market thickness has been found to be a particularly important factor in the early stages 
of licensing agreements, i.e. when sellers and buyers compare multiple potential partners and 
their knowledge (Agrawal et al., 2015). Hence, thicker markets for technology provide richer 
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and broader opportunities for licensing. They provide strong incentives for knowledge pro-
ducers to offer their knowledge proactively (Felin and Zenger, 2014). What is more, the mar-
ket mechanism requires that the knowledge be offered in codified form and largely ready to 
use, i.e. not requiring further interaction with the knowledge producer (Conti et al., 2013). 
These features reduce absorption costs.  
The nature of demand on markets for technology 
Many industries in which competitive advantage is based on technology experience a high 
pace of technological change so that a pure recourse on internal resources is often too costly 
and time consuming even for advanced firms (e.g., Motohashi, 2008). Markets for technology 
are an option to supplement the internal knowledge base and to widen the strategic opportuni-
ties of the buyer (Arque-Castells and Spulber, 2018). The use of internal and external 
knowledge sources offers additional opportunities for recombination, improving innovation 
performance (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Combinations from external and internal 
knowledge sources include idiosyncratic elements which delay the imitation of innovations 
by competitors (Kogut and Zander, 1992).  
Firms can obtain external knowledge through relational or transactional mechanisms 
(Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). Relational mechanisms include – among other channels – R&D 
collaborations (e.g., Fitjar and Rodríguez-Pose, 2013), consortia (e.g., Branstetter and 
Sakakibara, 2002) and consulting (e.g., Grimpe and Hussinger, 2013). Transactional modes 
include R&D outsourcing (e.g., Grimpe and Kaiser, 2010), mergers and acquisitions (e.g., 
Ahuja and Katila, 2001) and in particular the purchase of external knowledge in the form of 
patents and licensing agreements on markets for technology (e.g., Ceccagnoli and Jiang, 
2013). Relational and transactional modes of external knowledge sourcing are not mutually 
exclusive but may overlap, for example in technology alliances (Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). 
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External knowledge sourcing does not occur in isolation but is strongly linked to the ca-
pabilities and assets of the firm receiving the knowledge. A large body of research stresses 
the importance of absorptive capacity, which is defined as the capability to evaluate, assimi-
late and transform external knowledge to commercial ends and typically a by-product of in-
ternal R&D efforts (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Since the applicability and the commercial 
value of new technologies are often not obvious ex-ante, pursuing R&D in-house helps to 
learn about technological problems via trial and error (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). A strong 
expertise in technological issues thereby helps the potential buyer to separate useful from 
useless technology (Ceccagnoli and Jiang, 2013). In that sense, existing research has shown 
that internal and external R&D are complements rather than substitutes (Cassiman and 
Veugelers, 2006; Ceccagnoli, Higgins, and Palermo, 2014). Taken together, we conclude that 
the demand on market for technology emerges from expectations of firms that (a) knowledge 
on markets for technologies can be effectively and efficiently acquired and absorbed as well 
as (b) advances a firm’s innovation performance relative to internal R&D efforts. 
Drivers of demand on markets for technology 
We reason that the considerations of firms to buy knowledge on markets for technology are 
to a substantial degree determined by their industry. More specifically, we delineate two in-
dustry aspects that are likely to determine the demand of firms in a specific industry: the gen-
eral pattern of innovation that an industry follows, and the industry’s distance to the techno-
logical frontier. 
Sectoral patterns of innovation 
We start the discussion of structural features determining sectoral differences in the demand 
on markets for technology with differences in the nature of technological change and innova-
tion across industries. Knowledge is cumulative in nature and emerges in sector specific tra-
jectories resulting in a knowledge base of an industry that largely differs in means of 
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knowledge creation, the sources of new knowledge as well as in the predominant strategies of 
appropriation (Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008). This knowledge base – or technological re-
gime – shapes and constrains what is technologically and economically feasible and what not 
(de Jong and Marsili, 2006; Pavitt, 1998). In his seminal work, Pavitt (1984) differentiates 
between four groups of industries: science-based industries, specialized suppliers, scale-in-
tensive industries and supplier-dominated industries. Within these categories, science-based 
industries are the technologically most advanced while supplier-dominated industries are the 
technologically least advanced groups. We briefly introduce all four groups. 
Science-based industries use a complex knowledge base, and technology is produced to a 
considerable extent through internal R&D (Pavitt, 1984). The firms are typically large, and 
collaboration with universities or research labs is common. Due to the advanced internal 
R&D capabilities and the collaboration with scientific partners, inventions in science-based 
industries have a high degree of novelty, are technological in nature and can consequently of-
ten be protected with patents (Pavitt, 1984). Examples of science-based industries are the 
pharmaceuticals or electronics industries.  
Specialized suppliers are typically smaller firms, which produce advanced machinery 
that is purchased by firms from other sectors (Pavitt, 1984). The latter use products from spe-
cialized suppliers to increase the efficiency of their own production processes. Specialized 
suppliers strongly rely on engineering and design capabilities as well as on the knowledge of 
users (Castellacci, 2008). Leading mechanisms of appropriation are design, know-how, tacit 
user knowledge and patents (Pavitt, 1984). Typical industries are manufacturers of machinery 
and electrical equipment.  
Scale-intensive industries are strongly linked to specialized suppliers (Pavitt, 1984). 
Firms in these industries rely on a complex knowledge base, which is rooted in operative effi-
ciency rather than in scientific principles (Castellacci, 2008). The exploitative use of external 
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technology is connected with a large plant and market size (Pavitt, 1984). Typical industries 
are manufacturers of chemicals, rubber and plastic products, consumer durables and the auto-
mobile industry.  
Finally, supplier-dominated industries have some internal R&D capabilities but mainly 
source disembodied technology from suppliers to save on costs (Pavitt, 1984). Central means 
of appropriation are non-technical and comprise trademarks, aesthetics, design and marketing 
activities. Representative industries include the manufacturing of leather, textiles and paper 
as well as agriculture.  
While highly influential, Pavitt’s taxonomy makes no explicit reference to the im-
portance of markets for technology in the respective groups. Nevertheless, it holds two impli-
cations for the study of demand on markets for technology. First, the taxonomy suggests that 
there is a division of innovative labor (Castellacci, 2008), i.e. some industries tend to be 
knowledge producers while others tend to be users of knowledge generated externally. Sec-
ond, the appropriation mechanisms differ significantly between the sectors (Pavitt, 1984). 
Science-based industries and specialized suppliers are technologically advanced and rely 
strongly on formal protection of their intellectual property, while the use particularly of pa-
tents is less pronounced in scale-intensive and supplier-dominated industries. However, the 
codification of knowledge and the protection through patents are generally regarded as a pre-
requisite for trading technology on markets (Arora et al., 2001). Hence, both implications are 
likely to influence the demand on markets for technology. In that sense, we expect science-
based industries to exhibit strong demand on markets for technology. Firms in science-based 
industries typically possess the absorptive capacity required to assess the relevance of tech-
nologies that can be found on markets and therefore identify those technologies that are most 
promising or complementary to their own knowledge base. At the same time, patents are of 
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high importance in science-based industries, which facilitates the exchange of knowledge and 
technology. 
Specialized suppliers can be assumed to be technologically advanced enough to assess 
the value of external technology. Then again, specialized suppliers are often small in size. 
Smaller size may indicate a lack of downstream capabilities for production and marketing, 
which decreases the incentives to purchase external technology. Smaller size may however 
also hint at resource constraints in general which in turn motivates firms to source technology 
externally instead of engaging in costly internal R&D efforts.  
Firms in scale-intensive industries are typically technologically less advanced which 
makes the evaluation of disembodied technology more difficult due to lacking absorptive ca-
pacity. Yet, the linkages to specialized suppliers and the reliance on a complex knowledge 
base suggest that firms in these industries procure to some extent knowledge on markets for 
technology.  
Finally, firms in supplier-dominated industries tend to lack substantive technological ca-
pabilities, while a large share of the returns from innovation is appropriated by non-techno-
logical intellectual property rights. For that reason, we expect the demand on markets for 
technology to be the smallest of all four industry groups.  
Technological leadership of industries 
Another important dimension separating industries with regard to their demand on markets 
for technology is how closely they operate to the global technological frontier of the industry. 
The concept of the technological frontier takes industries or firms in a region or worldwide in 
an order based on their level of technological progressiveness (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; 
Kumar and Russell, 2002). The technological frontier is a hypothetical construct that defines 
the optimum of what is technologically feasible at any given point in time (McCain, 1977). 
Industries in various countries differ in how close their innovation activities are to what is 
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globally possible. Industries at the technological frontier are forced to keep pace with techno-
logical progress and can hardly rely on established knowledge stocks traded on markets for 
technology (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). Their competitive advantage is anchored in yet un-
known re-combinations of diverse knowledge. Grimpe and Sofka (2016) argue that lagging 
industries are comparatively more likely to benefit from mature technologies on markets for 
technology. Lagging industries rely on “off the shelf” technologies and efficient implementa-
tion instead of creating a new technology (Arora et al., 2001). Pursuing strategies of imitation 
and reliance on sophisticated technologies from highly specialized sellers allows industries 
with a higher distance to the technological frontier to save on costs and to foster growth 
(Mahmood and Rufin, 2005).  
As a result, firms in leading industries typically acquire external knowledge through rela-
tional rather than transactional mechanisms because the degree of novelty of knowledge 
traded on markets for technology tends to be lower (Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). Moreover, 
knowledge traded on markets for technology is of comparatively lower complexity (Caviggi-
oli et al., 2017). In fact, firms with advanced internal R&D capacities have been shown to in-
ternalize the development of new technologies instead of purchasing technology on markets 
(Atuahene-Gima and Patterson, 1993). Taken together, we expect that demand on markets for 
technologies increases with the distance of the industry from the global technological fron-
tier. Put differently, globally lagging industries are particularly likely to source technologies 
on markets for technology. 
Given the complex nature by which sectoral innovation patterns and technological lead-
ership of an industry determine jointly the demand on markets for technology in an industry, 
we conduct an explorative empirical study. 
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DATA AND METHODS 
Data 
The empirical part of this paper is based on data from multiple sources. The foundation of the 
dataset consists of industry-level data from the EU Community Innovation Survey (CIS), 
which is a widely used survey instrument to measure the innovativeness and innovative be-
havior of firms within the EU member states and some neighboring countries (e.g., Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2006; Laursen and Salter, 2006; Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). Relevant parts of 
the survey include separate questions on types of innovation, expenditures for internal and 
external R&D and expenditures for external knowledge. This feature makes CIS particularly 
useful for the purpose of our study since it enables us to track demand on markets for tech-
nology for a wide variety of industries and countries as well as separate from other R&D in-
vestments. 
CIS is a bi-annual survey, and we utilize the survey waves carried out in 2008, 2010, 
2012 and 2014.1 In each survey year, the responses of the participants refer to the three-year 
period prior to (and including) the survey year. CIS has been found to provide high quality 
data since heads of R&D departments and innovation managers are asked directly about im-
portant aspects of innovativeness in their firms (Sofka and Grimpe, 2010). Several steps of 
preparation and quality assurance like extensive pre-testing and piloting in various contexts 
ensure a high quality of the data with regard to representativeness, interpretability, reliability 
and validity (Laursen and Salter, 2006). Response accuracy is increased by the provision of 
detailed definitions and examples of the underlying concepts.  
                                                 
1 The CIS introduced a new structure in the disseminated tables for the survey carried out in 2016. To facilitate 
comparability, we restricted our sample to the four survey years mentioned. 
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Harmonized survey results aggregated at the industry level are publicly released by Eu-
rostat to provide information on the innovativeness of the EU, its member states and their in-
dustries. However, data are not uniformly available for all EU member states and years due to 
individual contracts between the participating countries and Eurostat about the provision of 
data. Our analysis is therefore focused on 15 European countries with complete data records 
for the period under study, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovak Republic and Spain. 
In sum, we end up with 1249 observations on the industry level by country and year. The in-
dustry level data from the CIS are augmented with country-level data from the European In-
novation Scoreboard, the Global Competitiveness Index of the World Economic Forum, and 
OECD statistics.  
Variables 
Dependent variable 
The CIS questionnaire contains detailed questions on the different types of expenditures for 
innovation activities, including expenditures for internal R&D and external knowledge. To 
measure the demand on markets for technology, i.e. our dependent variable, we use data from 
the question regarding the expenditures for “other external knowledge”. This variable cap-
tures mainly licensing expenditures and expenditures for the acquisition of patents from other 
parties. The variable does not include expenditures for external R&D in general or for exter-
nal knowledge embodied in machinery, equipment, or software. Since the variable is highly 
skewed, we use its natural logarithm in all estimations. It is important to note that the depend-
ent variable captures only the realized demand on markets for technology on the industry 
level and not the “deals not done” (Agrawal et al., 2015). 
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Explanatory variables 
Our first explanatory variable is the pattern of innovation that an industry commonly follows 
(Pavitt, 1984; Castellacci, 2008). To identify the industries that belong to specific patterns of 
innovation, we follow the approach of Bonaccorsi et al. (2013) who map NACE industry 
codes onto Pavitt’s taxonomy. More specifically, we create four dummy variables measuring 
the sectoral patterns of innovation as follows. The NACE (Rev. 2) codes 10-12, 19, 20, 22-
25, 29 and 30 are classified as scale-intensive industries; NACE 27, 28 and 33 as specialized 
suppliers; NACE 21 and 26 as science-based industries; all other NACE codes cover sup-
plier-dominated industries.  
Our second explanatory variable is an industry’s distance to the technological frontier. 
We follow prior research which argues that relative R&D expenditures can proxy for an in-
dustry’s position vis-à-vis the technological frontier (e.g., Chung and Alcácer, 2002; Grimpe 
and Sofka, 2016). To measure distance to the frontier, we first determine the (hypothetical) 
technological frontier by comparing the R&D intensity (internal R&D expenditures divided 
by sales) of a specific industry between the countries in our sample. The country-industry 
with the highest value for internal R&D intensity serves as the technological frontier.2 Subse-
quently, we subtract the value for internal R&D for each country-industry from the identified 
technological frontier. The resulting value measures the distance to the technological frontier, 
with increasing values indicating higher distance to the technological frontier.  
As a consistency check, we follow Salomon and Jin (2008) and calculate the distance to 
the technological frontier by normalizing the country-industry’s R&D expenditure by the 
                                                 
2 The maximum value of the R&D intensity in our sample does not necessarily correspond to the global techno-
logical frontier. However, we use this measurement since our sample contains a number of technologically 
highly advanced countries in Europe and since our focus of analysis is on markets for technology in Europe and 
not worldwide. 
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country’s GDP and subtract from this the average R&D/GDP of all other countries. Increas-
ing values of the variable indicate relative technological leadership (i.e. decreasing distance 
to the technological frontier).  
Control variables  
We use several control variables at the industry and the country level that could potentially 
influence the degree to which industries demand technology on markets. First, we use the in-
dustry R&D intensity, defined as industry R&D expenditure over industry sales, as a proxy 
for the industry’s absorptive capacity (e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006). To account for a po-
tential nonlinearity of the relationship, we also include a squared term of the industry R&D 
intensity. Next, we include the total number of employees in an industry as a proxy for the 
overall size and economic importance of an industry in a country. We also include the aver-
age firm size defined as the total number of employees over the number of firms in an indus-
try in order to measure industry structure. Since transactions on markets for technology often-
times occur in connection with relational search (Grimpe and Sofka, 2016), we include the 
share of firms in an industry that reports to have any external collaborative activities.3 
On the country level, we control for the strength of the national innovation system by in-
cluding the gross domestic expenditures on R&D (GERD) as a share of GDP (Sofka and 
Grimpe, 2010). GERD covers the total R&D expenditures in a country by domestic and for-
eign actors like firms, research institutes and universities. As consistency checks, we use a 
variable that proxies for the available supply on markets for technology by measuring the 
number of PCT patent applications per billion Euro GDP. Moreover, we use a variable that 
                                                 
3 Missing values in the variables for industry in-house R&D expenditures (19.3 % missing), turnover (10.6 %), 
number of total enterprises (9.2 %) and number of employees (9.8 %) were replaced by the variables’ mean 
value calculated over all survey years. To control for a potential non-response bias we calculated dummy varia-
bles which indicate if values were replaced or not. Since the imputation dummies are highly correlated with 
each other, we include only one of them in our empirical models.  
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measures the strength of IP protection which has been referred to as an important factor de-
termining why deals are done or not (Gans et al., 2008). For this purpose, we use a survey-
based measure collected by the World Economic Forum as part of the Global Competitive-
ness Index indicating, on a scale from 1 to 7, the perceived strength of the protection of IP in 
a certain country. Both consistency check variables are highly correlated with the country 
GERD and thus can only enter the regressions separately. Finally, our regressions include 
country and year dummy variables to control for remaining differences on the country level 
as well as for time effects.  
Empirical approach 
We begin our results section by providing a mapping of the development of markets for tech-
nology in Europe. Next, we show descriptive statistics of all variables under study. Finally, 
we conduct pooled OLS regressions including country and time fixed effects. 
RESULTS 
Mapping markets for technology 
Before we proceed to explaining drivers of demand on markets for technology, we provide 
descriptive evidence on the development of markets for technology in Europe. The aggregate 
statistics indicate expenditures on markets for technology of 5.2 billion Euro in 2008, 3.6 bil-
lion Euro in 2010, 2.8 billion Euro in 2012 and 3.0 billion Euro in 2014.4 Moreover, we find 
the demand on markets for technology to vary markedly between industries and countries. 
Figure 1 shows the total expenditures for external knowledge in billion Euro within the four 
industry groups from Pavitt’s taxonomy over time. It turns out that the group of scale-inten-
                                                 
4 The countries in our sample cover about 73% of the total population in the EU member states in each survey 
year. The total market size in the EU can therefore be assumed about 30% larger. 
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sive industries exhibits the highest overall expenditures, followed by science-based indus-
tries, specialized suppliers and supplier-dominated industries. While this is certainly driven 
by the number of industries that compose a particular group, it shows the difference in im-
portance of markets for technology among the four groups. Table 1 summarizes the expendi-
tures for external technology by year, industry group and country.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
With the exception of specialized suppliers, we find decreases in the expenditures during the 
period from 2008 to 2014, i.e. expenditures are almost cut in half. This suggests that markets 
for technology are volatile and that demand can be adjusted flexibly. Both supplier-domi-
nated industries and science-based industries experience decreasing expenditures during the 
entire period, while scale-intensive industries and specialized suppliers experience stable ex-
penditures or even increasing expenditures in 2014. The decrease is potentially connected to 
the economic and financial crises during this time period that has considerably impacted firm 
R&D expenditures and, apparently, also the demand on markets for technology (Teplykh, 
2017; Spescha and Woerter, 2018).  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
A slightly different picture emerges regarding expenditures for external knowledge relative to 
in-house R&D expenditures (Figure 2). Whereas the decline over time is observed for all in-
dustry groups (with the exception of specialized suppliers), markets for technology are fre-
quently used opportunities especially in the technologically least advanced subgroups (sup-
plier-dominated industries and scale-intensive industries).  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
Focusing on country differences, Figure 3 shows the total expenditures within the four largest 
European economies in our sample over time versus the remaining countries. German firms 
appear to be the most active on markets for technology, followed by France, Spain and Italy. 
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Again, we observe a decline in demand in the four countries from 2008 to 2014 with the ex-
ception of France, which exhibits a strong increase from 2012 to 2014. 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
Figure 4 allows a deeper insight into patterns of external knowledge purchasing within the 
smaller countries over time. Expenditures for external knowledge are cumulated and normal-
ized with the respective GDP of the country at time t. For the largest economies (Germany, 
France, Spain and Italy) the pattern of declining expenditures is confirmed. In most of the 
smaller economies, the expenditures are roughly stable. However, we see some notable ex-
ceptions. For the Czech Republic and Norway, we observe an increasing share of expendi-
tures over time. Hungary and the Slovak Republic show a sharp decrease from 2008-2010 
and subsequently a strong increase of normalized expenditures until 2014.  
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
Descriptive results 
Next, we turn to presenting descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression mod-
els. Table 2 shows the summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. We 
find that most industries in our sample are scale-intensive (44%), followed by supplier-domi-
nated (35%), specialized supplier (13%), and science-based industries (8%). The mean dis-
tance to the technological frontier, i.e. the difference between a focal industry’s R&D inten-
sity and the maximum R&D intensity of an industry in the sample, is 2.38%, but we also ob-
serve rather high variation in our data. Regarding our control variables, we find the average 
R&D intensity to be 1.13%, again with considerable variation in the data. The data also re-
veal that industries differ largely in the number of employees (min. 87, max. 1,035,370) and 
the average firm size (min. 17.4, max. 3675.75). On average, the share of firms in an industry 
engaged in any type of innovation collaboration is 19%, and countries spend 1.74% of their 
GDP on R&D.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 contains the pairwise correlation coefficients of the explanatory variables. We find no 
indication for collinearity as evidenced by the rather low correlation coefficients.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Regression results 
Table 4 shows the OLS regression results of the main models for the expenditures for exter-
nal knowledge (in log.). Model 1 includes the control variables only. The relationship be-
tween the control variables and the expenditures for external knowledge turn out to be largely 
consistent across all model specifications. We find an inverse U-shaped relationship between 
R&D intensity and the demand for external knowledge, indicating that higher R&D is ini-
tially associated with higher demand, likely because it provides absorptive capacity and al-
lows the integration of external knowledge. After a certain threshold, though, industries are 
technologically sophisticated and demand for external knowledge decreases. Presumably, the 
market does not offer much useful, i.e. sufficiently novel, knowledge. Moreover, we find that 
larger industry size and larger average firm size are positively associated with the demand for 
external knowledge. On the one hand, this indicates that larger industries with many firms 
contribute to market thickness since there are more transaction partners available. On the 
other hand, markets for technology seem to be more useful for larger firms compared to 
smaller firms. Next, we find that industries in which more firms are also engaged in innova-
tion collaboration exhibit higher demand on markets for technology. This underlines the no-
tion that markets for technology are oftentimes used in connection with more relational forms 
of knowledge acquisition, such as collaborative R&D (Grimpe and Sofka, 2016). Lastly, 
Model 1 also demonstrates that more technologically advanced countries as measured by a 
country’s total R&D expenditures (GERD) over GDP have more demand on markets for 
technology. 
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Model 2 contains the three dummy variables for the industry groups from Pavitt’s taxon-
omy, with supplier-dominated industries being the reference category. As expected, we find 
science-based industries to be strongly positively associated with demand for external 
knowledge. The coefficient turns out to be much larger than for the other industry groups. 
Scale-intensive and specialized supplier industries also have a significant positive but com-
paratively smaller relationship with demand. In relative terms, supplier-dominated industries, 
the reference group in our estimations, show significantly lower demand on markets for tech-
nology.  
Model 3 includes the control variables and the variable measuring the distance to the 
technological frontier, which we find to be positively and significantly associated with the de-
mand for external knowledge. This finding indicates that industries spend more on external 
knowledge when they are increasingly distant to the technological frontier. This confirms our 
expectations that technologically sophisticated industries have comparatively less to gain 
from acquiring knowledge on markets for technology. 
Model 4 includes both the dummies for sectoral innovation patterns and the distance 
measure. We find the results to be consistent with the exception of the coefficient for special-
ized suppliers, which turns out to be no longer statistically significant. 
In addition, we create interaction terms between the industry groups and the measure for 
the distance to the technological frontier. Due to collinearity concerns, they cannot all enter 
the model at the same time. Model 5 shows the interaction between technological distance 
and scale-intensive industries to have a positive and significant association with the demand 
for external knowledge. Scale-intensive industries tend to have lower technological capabili-
ties. In combination with increasing distance to the technological frontier, these industries 
turn out to spend more on external knowledge, which is what can be expected to occur. 
Model 6 includes the interaction of technological distance and specialized supplier industries, 
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which shows up as not significant. Model 7 shows the interaction of technological distance 
and science-based industries which turns out to be negatively and significantly associated 
with the demand for external knowledge. This finding indicates that industries with higher 
technological capabilities tend to demand less on markets for technology with increasing dis-
tance to the technological frontier. The strong relationship between technological distance 
and market demand is in that sense attenuated for science-based industries. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Robustness checks 
Table 5 shows several robustness checks of our results when we use different measures for 
some of our explanatory variables. Model 1 includes the alternative measure for the distance 
to the technological frontier based on Salomon and Jin (2008). The coefficient turns out to be 
negative and significant. Since higher values of the variable indicate relative technological 
leadership, the negative coefficient is in line with the measure for technological distance used 
in the main models. Models 2 and 3 include the alternative measures for the country 
GERD/GDP, namely the normalized PCT patent applications of a country and the IPR pro-
tection index. While we find a consistent positive and significant relationship for the former 
variable, the index turns out to be unrelated to the demand for external knowledge. Overall, 
these findings provide confidence in our main model results.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
DISCUSSION 
Markets for technology are important institutions that facilitate vertical specialization and a 
division of labor in innovation, thereby increasing the allocative efficiency of innovation ac-
tivities in a country (Arora et al., 2001; Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Arora and 
Nandkumar, 2012). Despite their importance, our understanding of the development of such 
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markets is surprisingly coarse. We know relatively little about what drives firms in certain in-
dustries to engage with the market for technology as customers. Our study is designed to de-
lineate drivers of demand on markets for technology and map their presence across multiple 
countries and industries in Europe. 
The analysis of 15 European countries over the period from 2008 to 2014 shows that the 
market size in those countries is substantial (5.2 billion Euro in 2008) but also volatile (2.8 
billion Euro in 2012 and 3.0 billion Euro in 2014). Interestingly, we find that demand on mar-
kets for technology is pro-cyclical similar to other innovation inputs (Spescha and Woerter, 
2018) and affected by the economic crisis in Europe after 2008. Economic downturns are ac-
companied by increased uncertainty within the business environment and declining demand 
increases the relative price of the innovative input. With the outcomes of innovation inputs 
typically becoming visible only with a 2-3 year time lag (Hall, Mairesse, and Mohnen, 2009), 
firms rely stronger on the exploitation of internal knowledge and capabilities rather than the 
exploration of something new (Teplykh, 2017). We find this logic to hold also in the context 
of demand for external knowledge on markets for technology. In that sense, our findings do 
not support the view that expenditures for external knowledge are not subject to cyclical fluc-
tuations because in-licensing is an opportunity to utilize new technology at comparatively 
lower risk (López-García, Montero, and Moral-Benito, 2013). 
Our results also show that the importance of the market for technology varies considera-
bly among industries. We follow Pavitt (1984) and Castellacci (2008) with regard to the iden-
tification of sectoral patterns of innovation and show that markets for technology play a 
markedly different role in these patterns. We find firms in supplier-dominated industries to be 
considerably less likely to generate demand for external knowledge on markets for technol-
ogy compared to other industry groups. In fact, firms in science-based industries are most 
likely to demand external knowledge, followed by firms in scale-intensive industries (positive 
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results for specialized supplier industries are not consistently significant). This result is in line 
with prior literature given the ability of science-based industries to codify knowledge and the 
high propensity to protect inventions through patents (Arora et al., 2001; Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010). Thus, a higher propensity to patent implies thicker markets for technol-
ogy in science-based industries, which allows for higher allocative efficiency (Gans and 
Stern, 2010). Moreover, our results support the view that scale-intensive industries are im-
portant recipients of externally produced technology (Pavitt, 1984). 
Next, we address the degree to which an industry in a country is positioned vis-à-vis the 
technological frontier (Kumar and Russell, 2002; Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). Apparently, 
industries at the technological frontier cannot rely on readily developed knowledge to keep 
pace with technological progress (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005). Indeed, we find striking evi-
dence that industries spend more money on markets for technology the further away they are 
from the technological frontier. In that sense, markets for technology provide a means to 
catch up, at least to some extent, with the technological frontier. Our results also show that 
the extent to which lagging industries rely on external knowledge is not equally pronounced 
in the four industry groups. While firms in scale-intensive industries demand more external 
knowledge on markets when the industry is further away from the technological frontier, 
firms in science-based industries demand less when the industry is further away from the 
frontier. Apparently, when competitive advantage is based on innovative technologies, as for 
firms in science-based industries, using the market for technology is not a viable strategy. 
This finding underlines the heterogeneous response of firms within a certain pattern of inno-
vation to being behind the technological frontier.  
In sum, we contribute to extant literature in three ways. First, we identify structural fea-
tures of industries that propel or constrain demand on markets for technology (Arora and 
Gambardella, 2010). We alleviate the strong and oftentimes implicit assumption in existing 
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literature that demand on markets for technology is uniformly available. Instead, we identify 
two factors, sectoral innovation patterns and technological leadership of an industry that de-
termine demand on markets for technology. We trace these industry differences back to how 
efficiently firms in an industry can acquire and absorb knowledge from markets for technol-
ogy and how much value this particular knowledge creates when compared and combined 
with their internal R&D investments. Hence, we provide mechanisms, which other studies 
can use to (a) explore other sources of heterogeneity of demand on markets for technology 
and (b) avoid biased results in studies ignoring such heterogeneities. We demonstrate this het-
erogeneity by providing a systematic account of the demand side of markets for technology in 
Europe for the period from 2008 to 2014, differentiated by industry. 
Second, we advance literature that analyses the consequences of industry differences in 
patterns of innovation activities and technological leadership by extending it to consequences 
for sectoral markets for technology. Prior literature has largely acknowledged that firms in 
certain sectors are more likely to rely on knowledge produced by others (e.g., Pavitt, 1984; 
Castellacci, 2008) but it does not consider the instruments by which firms can interact with 
knowledge producers in other firms or industries. Our focus on markets for technology is par-
ticularly relevant for studying sectoral innovation patterns since markets are arguably the 
most efficient mechanism to govern such interactions. Markets for technology offer consider-
able cost advantages and the flexibility associated with market transactions which can out-
weigh the advantages of other, more collaborative and relational forms of external knowledge 
acquisition (e.g., Laursen and Salter, 2006). In sum, we extend the literature on sectoral inno-
vation patterns by highlighting how buying knowledge on markets for technology is an inte-
gral part of innovation in science-based industries and to a lesser degree in scale-intensive 
ones. Moreover, we show that the demand on markets for technology depends on the indus-
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try’s leadership status which highlights that industries benefit unevenly from developed mar-
kets because markets may simply not offer access to the most cutting-edge research but rather 
to a considerable amount of “shelf-warmer technologies” (Grimpe, 2006).  
Third, our analysis provides an empirical platform that other studies can use to quantify 
the size of markets for technology in various industries and countries based on publicly avail-
able data from the CIS. Our data constitute a unique measure of the demand side which com-
plements prior efforts in the literature that have focused on measures such as the supply of 
university patents (e.g., Arora and Nandkumar, 2012), or narrowly focused on industries with 
high patent propensity (e.g., Gambardella et al., 2007). Hence, our research addresses not 
only the general shortage of data on these particular market transactions but can trigger future 
research on a variety of related topics, such as the interaction of markets for technology with 
firm strategies and particularly those directed at opening up the innovation process (Grimpe 
and Sofka, 2016). 
Our findings have immediate relevance for policy making on markets for technology. 
Our mapping of demand on markets for technology allows tailoring innovation policies in-
tended to expanding the overall size and utilization of markets for technology to specific in-
dustries. In that sense, science, technology and innovation (STI) policy needs to acknowledge 
that markets for technology are considerably driven by industry-related factors, such as the 
pattern of innovation and the technological sophistication, rather than by country-level fac-
tors. Consequently, policies should be sector-specific and take into account that the potentials 
for markets for technologies reach their limits when the technological sophistication of indus-
tries in certain countries increases. 
29 
CONCLUSION 
While we provide comprehensive evidence on the development of markets for technology in 
Europe, our research is not free from limitations, which – at the same time – offer promising 
avenues for future research. Our data captures a specific view on the “true” size of the market 
for technology in Europe for several reasons. First, the coverage of the data is incomplete due 
to individual agreements between the EU member countries and Eurostat. Second, the ques-
tionnaire structure does not allow drawing any conclusions on the demand for external 
knowledge on the European market by foreign firms, which are not part of the sampled popu-
lation of firms in the EU member states. Third, our measure for the demand of markets for 
technology comprises only realized demand. Prior literature, however, emphasizes that a con-
siderable part of technology deals remains unrealized due to market imperfections.  
Future research should therefore broaden the basis on which the demand on markets for 
technology can be estimated. Moreover, there are probably additional important explanatory 
variables that could improve our understanding of what shapes market demand. Specifically, 
it would be interesting to contrast data on expenditures with data on revenues on markets for 
technology. This would enable an investigation of the relationships regarding the flow of dis-
embodied technological knowledge between and across firms in different sectoral patterns 
(Pavitt, 1984).  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Expenditures for other external knowledge by year, industry-group and country 
(Source: own calculations based on Eurostat data) 
 
Expenditures in 
Euro per 1000 Euro sales 
 
 
Expenditures as a share of 
in-house R&D 
 
 2008 2010 2012 2014  2008 2010 2012 2014 
Supplier-dominated industries                    
Austria   0.055 0.020 0.017 0.025  0.110 0.027 0.034 0.031 
Belgium   0.030 0.044 0.019 0.020  0.037 0.072 0.032 0.044 
Czech Republic   0.019 0.043 0.015 0.026  0.031 0.141 0.030 0.077 
Estonia   0.019 0.043 0.007 0.009  0.186 0.179 0.049 0.051 
Finland   0.098 0.106 0.031 0.018  0.180 0.187 0.059 0.036 
France   0.022 0.040 0.042 0.014  0.034 0.034 0.045 0.016 
Germany   0.075 0.054 0.038 0.039  0.121 0.065 0.043 0.045 
Hungary   0.306 0.017 0.158 0.039  1.632 0.116 0.109 0.124 
Italy   0.035 0.039 0.027 0.016  0.070 0.055 0.049 0.031 
Latvia   0.008 0.006 0.000 0.004  0.191 0.233 0.009 0.045 
Netherlands   0.014 0.021 0.006 0.014  0.039 0.053 0.019 0.041 
Norway   0.035 0.021 0.024 0.036  0.054 0.035 0.031 0.046 
Poland   0.008 0.008 0.006 0.006  0.090 0.087 0.047 0.050 
Slovak Republic   0.025 0.008 0.002 0.064  0.148 0.020 0.009 1.238 
Spain   0.007 0.001 0.003 0.011  0.019 0.003 0.008 0.021 
Scale-intensive industries                   
Austria   0.037 0.021 0.025 0.036  0.032 0.018 0.019 0.035 
Belgium   0.016 0.038 0.029 0.005  0.028 0.072 0.054 0.010 
Czech Republic   0.023 0.064 0.071 0.142  0.052 0.163 0.192 0.359 
Estonia   0.018 0.036 0.030 0.009  0.064 0.045 0.019 0.021 
Finland   0.048 0.031 0.018 0.017  0.056 0.030 0.017 0.021 
France   0.093 0.047 0.017 0.045  0.059 0.032 0.011 0.032 
Germany   0.089 0.071 0.061 0.043  0.055 0.035 0.033 0.021 
Hungary   0.129 0.016 0.006 0.032  0.870 0.090 0.031 0.169 
Italy   0.063 0.036 0.017 0.014  0.129 0.052 0.028 0.027 
Latvia   0.004 0.019 0.008 0.007  0.138 0.486 0.299 0.104 
Netherlands   0.013 0.031 0.004 0.009  0.021 0.034 0.004 0.013 
Norway   0.008 0.018 0.016 0.053  0.012 0.029 0.021 0.072 
Poland   0.009 0.025 0.008 0.008  0.075 0.139 0.062 0.041 
Slovak Republic   0.121 0.025 0.050 0.084  1.638 0.148 0.408 0.411 
Spain   0.117 0.114 0.084 0.070  0.317 0.234 0.191 0.174 
Specialized suppliers                   
Austria   0.067 0.078 0.039 0.074  0.016 0.015 0.009 0.015 
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Expenditures in 
Euro per 1000 Euro sales 
 
 
Expenditures as a share of 
in-house R&D 
 
 2008 2010 2012 2014  2008 2010 2012 2014 
Belgium   0.032 0.043 0.052 0.086  0.012 0.016 0.021 0.037 
Czech Republic   0.027 0.028 0.160 0.101  0.037 0.034 0.171 0.096 
Estonia   0.004 0.030 0.015 0.005  0.010 0.076 0.026 0.010 
Finland   0.039 0.054 0.013 0.024  0.014 0.018 0.004 0.008 
France   0.061 0.042 0.006 0.161  0.032 0.028 0.003 0.072 
Germany   0.066 0.056 0.038 0.046  0.026 0.016 0.011 0.013 
Hungary   0.022 0.011 0.203 0.283  0.074 0.031 0.038 0.776 
Italy   0.065 0.065 0.044 0.029  0.064 0.043 0.038 0.024 
Latvia   0.004 0.000 0.114 0.005  0.133 0.007 0.840 0.040 
Netherlands   0.021 0.025 0.012 0.019  0.007 0.007 0.003 0.005 
Norway   0.008 0.012 0.026 0.088  0.006 0.011 0.021 0.059 
Poland   0.066 0.038 0.063 0.041  0.190 0.076 0.130 0.084 
Slovak Republic   0.066 0.079 0.008 1.115  0.157 0.183 0.014 2.304 
Spain   0.003 0.006 0.003 0.009  0.004 0.006 0.002 0.008 
Science-based industries                   
Austria   0.068 0.053 1.281 0.305  0.006 0.005 0.092 0.034 
Belgium   0.225 0.938 0.345 0.132  0.017 0.078 0.034 0.009 
Czech Republic   0.086 0.220 0.029 0.052  0.133 0.354 0.046 0.058 
Estonia   1.110 0.010 0.020 0.001  2.081 0.030 0.031 0.003 
Finland   0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042  0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
France   0.408 0.125 0.082 0.136  0.091 0.024 0.017 0.026 
Germany   0.254 0.183 0.155 0.137  0.046 0.026 0.022 0.016 
Hungary   0.054 0.036 0.035 0.115  0.054 0.038 0.018 0.080 
Italy   0.138 0.130 0.091 0.093  0.041 0.036 0.052 0.029 
Latvia   0.039 0.047 0.000 0.022  0.013 0.037 0.000 0.016 
Netherlands   0.142 0.194 0.161 0.055  0.016 0.028 0.019 0.020 
Norway   0.050 0.080 0.118 0.222  0.006 0.012 0.016 0.052 
Poland   0.093 0.301 0.086 0.123  0.106 0.705 0.105 0.150 
Slovak Republic   0.000 0.072 0.002 0.294  0.001 0.442 0.009 1.278 
Spain   0.077 0.031 0.014 0.017  0.025 0.010 0.004 0.005 
    
  
35 
Table 2: Summary statistics (n=1249) 
 Mean St.Dev min max 
Expenditures for other external knowledge (log.) 6.553 2.797 0 13.327 
R&D as a share of sales 1.128 2.090 0 26.348 
Number of employees 71958.84 116000 87 1035370 
Average firm size 112.569 188.567 17.4 3675.75 
Share of collaborating firms 0.185 0.150 0 1 
GERD as a share of GDP 1.737 0.798 .462 3.726 
Imputation dummy (d) 0.002 0.040 0 1 
Supplier-dominated industries (d) 0.355 0.479 0 1 
Scale-intensive industries(d) 0.440 0.497 0 1 
Specialized supplier industries (d) 0.128 0.334 0 1 
Science-based industries (d) 0.077 0.266 0 1 
Distance to technological frontier 2.375 3.552 0 26.332 
 
 
Table 3: Correlation coefficients (n=1249) 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) R&D as a share of 
sales 
1 
(2) Number of em-
ployees (log.) 
0.014 1 
(3) Average firm size 
(log.) 
0.311 0.027 1 
(4) Share of collabo-
rating firms 
0.488 -0.274 0.561 1 
(5) GERD as a share 
of GDP 
0.197 0.043 0.101 0.328 1 
(6) Imputation 
dummy (d) 
-0.002 0.008 0.032 0.019 -0.051 1 
(7) Supplier-domi-
nated industries (d) 
-0.221 -0.136 -0.441 -0.312 0.054 -0.030 1 
(8) Scale-intensive in-
dustries (d) 
-0.095 0.121 0.304 0.134 -0.004 0.005 -0.658 1 
(9) Specialized sup-
plier industries (d) 
0.100 0.082 -0.007 -0.024 -0.019 -0.015 -0.284 -0.340 1 
(10) Science-based in-
dustries (d) 
0.450 -0.084 0.233 0.341 -0.066 0.064 -0.214 -0.256 -0.111 1 
(11) Distance to tech-
nological frontier 
0.105 -0.108 0.357 0.220 -0.192 0.060 -0.306 -0.124 0.195 0.536 
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Table 4: OLS regressions for the demand on markets for technology – main models 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
R&D as a share of sales 0.305*** 0.195*** 0.263*** 0.220*** 0.205*** 0.221*** 0.193*** 
 (0.050) (0.056) (0.051) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.059) 
R&D as a share of sales (sq.) -0.016*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of employees (log.) 1.203*** 1.182*** 1.250*** 1.217*** 1.242*** 1.219*** 1.214*** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) 
Average firm size (log.) 0.265*** 0.195** 0.143 0.099 0.057 0.096 0.108 
 (0.089) (0.093) (0.092) (0.098) (0.098) (0.099) (0.098) 
Share of collaborating firms 2.095*** 1.468*** 1.886*** 1.467*** 1.566*** 1.474*** 1.440*** 
 (0.517) (0.526) (0.514) (0.524) (0.523) (0.526) (0.524) 
GERD as a share of GDP 0.757** 0.765** 0.741** 0.757** 0.784** 0.757** 0.768** 
 (0.350) (0.346) (0.346) (0.345) (0.344) (0.345) (0.345) 
Imputation dummy (d) 4.142*** 3.857*** 3.968*** 3.823*** 3.946*** 3.819*** 3.972*** 
 (1.174) (1.164) (1.164) (1.160) (1.156) (1.161) (1.162) 
Scale-intensive industries (d)  0.357***  0.343*** 0.186 0.340*** 0.339*** 
  (0.120)  (0.120) (0.128) (0.121) (0.120) 
Specialized suppliers (d)  0.350**  0.159 0.318* 0.176 0.149 
  (0.160)  (0.172) (0.178) (0.194) (0.172) 
Science-based industries (d)  1.235***  0.792*** 1.225*** 0.766** 1.521*** 
  (0.236)  (0.279) (0.306) (0.310) (0.490) 
Distance to techn. frontier   0.075*** 0.056*** 0.012 0.059** 0.068*** 
   (0.015) (0.019) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) 
Distance * scale-intensive     0.114***   
     (0.034)   
Distance * specialized suppl.      -0.007  
      (0.035)  
Distance * science-based       -0.082* 
       (0.045) 
Constant -8.348*** -7.793*** -8.319*** -7.801*** -7.949*** -7.815*** -7.811*** 
 (1.138) (1.147) (1.128) (1.143) (1.139) (1.146) (1.142) 
        
Year dummies included included included included included included included 
Country dummies included included included included included included included 
R2 0.667 0.675 0.673 0.677 0.680 0.677 0.678 
N 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 1249 
F 102.160 93.730 100.830 91.270 89.240 88.050 88.390 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        
Coefficients are shown; standard errors in parentheses; (d) dummy variable; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Country dummies and year dummies are each jointly significant 
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Table 5: OLS regressions on demand on markets for technology – robustness checks 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
R&D as a share of sales 0.223*** 0.216*** 0.211*** 
 (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) 
R&D as a share of sales (sq.)  -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of employees (log.) 1.210*** 1.221*** 1.220*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.052) 
Average firm size (log.) 0.210** 0.107 0.100 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.098) 
Share of collaborating enterprises 1.443*** 1.429*** 1.476*** 
 (0.530) (0.524) (0.526) 
GERD as a percentage of GDP 0.712**   
 (0.347)   
PCT patent applications per billion GDP  0.700***  
  (0.228)  
Intellectual property protection index   -0.232 
   (0.310) 
Imputation dummy (d) 3.910*** 3.854*** 3.819*** 
 (1.165) (1.158) (1.162) 
Scale-intensive industries (d) 0.326*** 0.331*** 0.337*** 
 (0.122) (0.120) (0.120) 
Specialized suppliers (d) 0.332** 0.145 0.153 
 (0.164) (0.172) (0.173) 
Science-based industries (d) 1.167*** 0.788*** 0.791*** 
 (0.244) (0.278) (0.279) 
Distance to technological frontier  0.057*** 0.057*** 
  (0.019) (0.019) 
Alternative measure for distance to technological frontier -0.187*   
 (0.109)   
Constant -7.982*** -10.936*** -4.552** 
 (1.162) (1.806) (1.882) 
    
Year dummies included included included 
Country dummies included included included 
R2 0.675 0.678 0.676 
N 1233 1249 1249 
F 89.180 91.770 90.800 
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Coefficients are shown; standard errors in parentheses; (d) dummy variable; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
Country dummies and year dummies are each jointly significant 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Total expenditures for external knowledge on markets for technology by industry 
group 
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Figure 2: Total expenditures for external knowledge on markets for technology by industry 
group (normalized with in-house R&D expenditures) 
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Figure 3: Total expenditures for external knowledge on markets for technology by country5 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
5 The values for Germany could not be obtained from the survey in 2010. They were imputed with the average 
values from the survey waves in 2008, 2012 and 2014. 
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Figure 4: Expenditures for external knowledge on markets for technology (normalized with 
GDP)6  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 The values for Germany could not be obtained from the survey in 2010. They were imputed with the average 
values from the survey waves in 2008, 2012 and 2014. 
0
.0
0
0
5
.0
0
1
.0
0
1
5
.0
0
2
S
h
a
re
 o
f 
G
D
P
A
u
s
tr
ia
B
e
lg
iu
m
C
z
e
c
h
R
e
p
u
b
lic
E
s
to
n
ia
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
c
e
G
e
rm
a
n
y
H
u
n
g
a
ry
It
a
ly
L
a
tv
ia
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
N
o
rw
a
y
P
o
la
n
d
S
lo
v
a
k
R
e
p
u
b
lic
S
p
a
in
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
2
0
0
8
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
4
ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische  
Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH Mannheim
ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European  
Economic Research
L 7,1 · 68161 Mannheim · Germany 
Phone  +49 621 1235-01  
info@zew.de · zew.de
Discussion Papers are intended to make results of ZEW 
research promptly avail able to other economists in order 
to encourage discussion and suggestions for revisions. 
The authors are solely respons ible for the contents which 
do not necessarily represent the opinion of the ZEW. 
IMPRINT
//
Download ZEW Discussion Papers from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/
or see:
https://www.ssrn.com/link/ZEW-Ctr-Euro-Econ-Research.html 
https://ideas.repec.org/s/zbw/zewdip.html
